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In this issue of Neuron, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) demonstrate that EEG signatures of real and fictive
learning differ early in processing, but the latent information in each event converges at the temporospatial
nexus commonly associated with the P3b component.It is apparent that people can learn by
committing actions and also by observing
the outcomes of actions not taken. The
outcomes of such ‘‘what if’’ scenarios
are known as counterfactual learning,
and they share many common processes
associated with learning by direct action
selection (Boorman et al., 2011; Chiu
et al., 2008; Hayden et al., 2009). Yet,
there remain many questions where these
processes inevitably diverge and where
they may possibly reconverge. In this
issue of Neuron, Fischer and Ullsperger
(2013) used electroencephalography
(EEG) to investigate the fine-grained tem-
poral divergence in neural processes
between direct and counterfactual condi-
tions, including how the latent information
in each trial converges on a final com-
mon pathway to influence future action
selection.
The Current Study
In this experiment, conditions were differ-
entiated by the lynchpin of volitional
choice to select or avoid a risky gamble
associated with different images. Over
time, participants learned the reward
probabilities of these images, and
selected more likely ones and avoid less
likely ones. Since feedback was provided
in either case, Fischer and Ullsperger
(2013) were able to investigate neurobe-
havioral adaptations towins versus losses
on gambles that were selected (reinforce-
ment versus punishment) or avoided (for
the sake of descriptive eloquence, we
will call these regret versus relief). Note
that in abstention, wins that would be rein-
forcing become regretful and a loss that
would be punishing invokes relief. While
punishing feedback to selected gambles
evoked well-known alterations in the
averaged EEG over midfrontal areas (i.e.,1040 Neuron 79, September 18, 2013 ª2013the feedback-related negativity and
P3a), ‘‘fictive’’ regretful feedback to
avoided actions failed to modulate these
midfrontal activities and were instead
associated with a novel finding of altered
early occipital activity. Yet, regardless of
the decision differentiation, the latent
information carried by worse-than-ex-
pected feedback had a common influ-
ence over later EEG activities, in which
punishment and regret were associated
with similar modulation of parietal activ-
ities 200–600 ms postfeedback. The
spatiotemporal nature of this finding
aligns with another well-known EEG
construct: the P3b component (so named
as it is the thirdmajor positive deflection in
the event-related potential, arriving in time
after the anterior P3a described earlier).
Two Roads Diverged
The difference in midfrontal versus occip-
ital activities due to real versus fictive
feedback was predicated on the purely
cognitive interpretation invoked by
choosing or avoiding the gamble. Both
of these responses required action com-
mission: participants had to press a
button to choose the gamble or press a
different button to abstain. Thus, fictive
feedback conditions were associated
with action commission, but this action
commission did not invoke an alteration
of midfrontal activities to worse-than-
expected feedback. As Fischer and
Ullsperger (2013) note, it appears that
choosing to abstain from a gamble is in
some ways like not committing an action
at all.
Previous EEG studies of counterfactual
learning have only revealed the outcome
of the nonselected gamble following a
two alternative forced choice scenario
(Goyer et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2011; YeungElsevier Inc.and Sanfey, 2004). These studies all
revealed diminished but reliable alteration
of the midfrontal feedback-related nega-
tivity and P3a to regret on the road not
taken; yet, none investigated the conse-
quence when no road is taken. It appears
that some important ingredient is missing
in mediofrontal systems when people
choose to abstain—but what could that
be? It was recently reported that these
same EEG signals were not modulated
when participants failed to develop an
expectation (Bismark et al., 2013), but
Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) suggest
that this was not the case here, as predic-
tion errors were associated with clear
EEG correlates to both real and fictive
feedback. Pure observation of punish-
ment does yield a modulation of these
EEG signals (Yu and Zhou, 2006), but
learning requires more than just observa-
tion. These new findings clearly motivate
the need for a more sophisticated under-
standing of the manner by which learning
in mediofrontal cortex is contingent on
expectation, agency, or both.
All Roads Lead to P3b
By applying algorithmic modeling (‘‘Q
learning’’), Fischer and Ullsperger (2013)
were able to derive the latent information
associated with varied parameters that
determine learning and action selection:
the value of committing an action for
each stimulus (Q value), the valence and
surprise of the feedback (prediction error),
and the rate at which feedback informa-
tion was integrated to update Q values
(learning rate). By using the trial-by-trial
values of each of these latent constructs
in a multiple regression at each time point
in the EEG, Fischer and Ullsperger (2013)
revealed that there were common
conjunctions between prediction error,
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switching the response for the upcoming
trial in parietal areas 200–600 ms
postfeedback (i.e., P3b). Thus, it
appears that P3b activities reflect the
convergence of constructs associated
with updating stimulus value information
in the service of adaptive control over
behavior.
To the imperative stimuli representing
the gambles, Fischer and Ullsperger
(2013) revealed separate EEG activities
that correlated with the Q value of
committing an action and the confidence
in action selection (Q values farther from
the maximally ambiguous 0.5 probability
of selecting versus avoiding). While the
state-action Q value was associated
with early prefrontal activities (cf. Hunt
et al., 2012), confidence in that choice
was associated with increased activity in
the spatiotemporal nexus of the P3b.
This is intriguing: P3b activities not only
reflected information for updating state-
action values and influencing future action
selection (following feedback) but also
reflected information about the confi-
dence in that state-action value (to the
gambling stimuli), which Fischer and
Ullsperger (2013) note could be used to
mitigate the influence of misleading prob-
abilistic feedback. The astute reader may
intuit that these activities should be recip-
rocally related—and in fact Fischer and
Ullsperger (2013) demonstrated that
smaller stimulus-locked P3b and larger
feedback-locked P3b contributed inde-
pendent variance when predicting future
behavioral switches from the current
choice. This may be interpreted as a
mechanistic description of how low deci-
sion confidence and highly surprising
aversive feedback can lead to altered
decision making.
Driven by Data
The multiple regression approach used
here capitalizes on prior knowledge of
temporospatial EEG features (e.g., P3b),
but side-steps methodological and inter-
pretive pitfalls common to the selection
of event-related potential components.
In addition, the operational definition ofcognitive events based on algorithmic
modeling facilitates a transparent and
replicable method for assessing the latent
cognitive features thought to influence
such neural signals. The advantage of
this combined data-driven method (with
appropriate correction for multiple com-
parisons) is exemplified here in the defini-
tion of the information content of neural
signals associated with P3b.
The psychological significance of P3b
has been long known, but an appropri-
ately sensitive and specific definition
remains be elusive. In a recent review,
Nieuwenhuis et al. (2005) summarized
how subjective probability and motiva-
tional significance, modulated by atten-
tion, codetermine P3b amplitude. The
P3b component is correlated with the
algorithmic quantification of surprise
(Mars et al., 2008) and has also been
shown to predict the decision to switch
behavioral responses (Chase et al.,
2010), yet rarely have these multitudinous
definitions and disparate findings been
combined to provide an inclusive descrip-
tion of the neurobehavioral correlates of
P3b. Indeed, a single global definition of
this neural event would be inappropriate,
as Fischer and Ullsperger (2013) demon-
strated an inversion of the relationship
between P3b amplitude and behavioral
outcome depending on whether the
neural signal was locked to the gambling
image or to the feedback.
By stepping away from cross-trial aver-
aging and oftentimes subjective peak-
picking methods common to event-
related potential analyses, Fischer and
Ullsperger (2013) have been able to pro-
vide novel insight into a wider class of
interrelated neurobehavioral phenomena.
However, themajor caveat of such a data-
driven approach is a lack of theoretical
motivation and generalizability. These
deficiencies in each method may be best
addressed by a synthesis: capitalizing
on the foundations provided by the rich
literature of event-related potentials while
developing methodological advance-
ments to push past previous boundaries.
Future advancements may include a
better understanding of the informationNeuron 79, Sepcarried within the EEG spectra within
this temporospatial network, as phase
and power information may reflect
different aspects of information content
(Buzsa´ki, 2010). Imminent reports are
also sure to further refine algorithmic
definitions for subjective probability (e.g.,
prediction error) and motivational signifi-
cance (e.g., learning rate); it will remain a
challenge to provide unbiased, trans-
parent, and highly generalizable defini-
tions of unobservable cognitive events.
Yet, as demonstrated by Fischer and
Ullsperger (2013), we are likely to
converge on a common understanding
the neural bases of higher cognitive func-
tions from many different paths.REFERENCES
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